In many contexts across the globe the scope and remit of planning is being limited. Much of the 4 academic literature identifies this tendency as arising from a tension between planning as a state-5 regulatory activity and the tenets of neoliberalism -particularly free market competition. In this 6 essay we seek to explore the degree to which this perceived incompatibility between planning 7 and the neoliberal order is genuinely real by running a thought experiment. We hope to show 8 that thinking about the development process in this way points to alternative ways of imagining 9 the scope and remit of planning -and how the normative principles at the core of the activity 10
Introduction
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In many contexts across the globe the scope and remit of urban and environmental planning is 
22
For some academics interested in making the case in favor of planning, corresponding attempts 23 to diminish the professional activity to make way for the market have been understood as an 24 'attack' (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014) . Others have highlighted the continuing public interest 25 justification that spawned planning in the first place (Campbell, 2012) . In some cases (Campbell 26 and Fainstein, 2012) the defence of planning, quite correctly, points out that the environment 27 (widely construed) is a very complex asset that is not well captured by those analyses of planning Correspondingly, the argument has emerged that there may be value in thinking of planning as a 34 'market maker' (Lord and O'Brien, 2017) and that planning may be conceived as an important 35 foil to the neoliberal hegemony rather than explicitly incompatible with it.
36
But what would this type of planning look like? Could we imagine ways in which a modernised 37 planning might combine these 'market making' aspects with its normative ends and professional 
52
In this paper we hope to further this debate by exploring from first principles the relationship 53 between how planning systems function at a human level and the outcomes they might entail. In 54 this respect our aim is to advance the literature on planning's capacity to effect meaningful 55 change in business decision making by exploring the intersection of "how real estate developers 56 think" (Brown, 2015) and how they might act and, correspondingly, any influence planning 57 might have in this regard. In this respect our contribution is to the nascent work that seeks to 58 develop a 'behavioral insights' take on planning (Bond et al., 2016; Ferrari et al., 2011; Jackson 59 and Watkins, 2008; Lord, 2009 Lord, , 2012 .
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The development process: rationality, belief and human behviour
62
There is now a huge corpus of research on the development process, much of it inspired by 63 various branches of economics. Perhaps the best example of this crossover comes in the shape 64 of transaction cost approaches that seek to understand the development process through the has on the quality of market conditions or the things it achieves that lie outside the parameters of 89 any given model.
90
In those cases where game theory has been applied to planning-orientated questions the focus 91 has usually been on the specific microeconomics of urban transformation, particularly questions 92 of land readjustment and compensation policy (Samsura, van der Krabben and van Deemen, to simulate with an appreciation of human agency (Batty, 2005) . The promise of this approach is 108 yet to be fully realized as the application of agent-based modelling to the development process is Secondly, we need to be able to translate this understanding into empirical investigation. This 129 would allow us to develop behavioral insights into the specifics of the 'planning game' that plays 130 out in any particular context.
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In this paper we hope to address the first question: how could we theorise counterparty 132 interaction in the development process to elucidate the importance of the beliefs that each forms The medium of the thought experiment is well-aligned to our objectives in this paper as we seek 151 to explore from first principles the effects of belief on the development process, how beliefs 152 might affect outcomes and how beliefs might be shaped through regulation. As established in 153 the foregoing discussion there cannot be said to be any singular real world with respect to the 154 development process: there are myriad approaches taken that vary wildly from place to place.
155
So, our aim is explicitly not to give a fine-grained rendering of how affecting beliefs might alter 
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In what follows we run a thought experiment that follows the well known folk game "Going to of what should be the underpinning goals of a system designed to mediate competing ends vis a vis 168 how our environment is governed. It is our contention in this paper that it is the value -and in 169 the values -of a planning system to appreciate that a range of potential outcomes are possible, that 170 they are belief-driven and that planning has the agency to seek to manage the beliefs that shape 171 the process towards one of these end states.
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Although we have explicitly and deliberately not sought to develop a thought experiment that 
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All other things being equal it is clear that Mark's preferred option is Site A. This is the best 212 choice for Mark so long as he believes that Cecilia will make any choice other than Site A. If
213
Mark believes that Cecilia has similar tastes to himself, and that she will likely pursue Site A too, For example, on reflection, Mark might arrive at the belief that he has a 60% expectation that 227 Cecilia will choose Site A and a 40% probability that she will choose Site B. If Mark holds this 228 belief about Cecilia's actions his expected utility can be summarized as a 60% chance that 229 following his own strict preferences will result in he and Cecilia competing for the same site (Site with Cecilia and, therefore, to enjoy a utility of 3. Similarly he anticipates a 40% chance that they 239 will have both opted for Site B, the presence of competition resulting in an expected utility of 0. The strength of Mark's preference for Site A now means that despite his belief that Cecilia also 314 favours this site and his very strong aversion to competition with Cecilia he will favour the 315 pursuit of this site to the others.
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Extension and Conclusions
317
Although this is only a simplified thought experiment it serves to reveal some significant points 'planning game' (Lord, 2012) .
353
To carry this conclusion through to an alternative policy prescription we can return to the point To run the thought experiment through to its conclusion if Mark believes that Cecilia has a 50% 366 probability of choosing Site A, a 30% preference for Site B and favours Site C to a degree of 
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We now show that given Cecilia's strategy which specifies A and B for type 1 and 2 respectively 419 Mark finds it optimal to choose C. For Mark, with probability 0.6 the left bi-matrix is being 420 played where according to Cecilia's strategy A is chosen, and with probability 0.4 the right bi- payoff by selecting C given Cecilia's equilibrium strategy.
425
In conclusion, Mark's belief of Cecilia choosing A with probability 0.6 and B with probability 0.4 426 is consistent with Cecilia's best response to Mark's choice of C. And Mark choosing C is rational 427 given his belief about Cecilia's type. 
